The Theory of Learning in Games (Economic Learning and Social Evolution) (Economics Learning and Social Evolution, 2)

In economics, most noncooperative game theory has focused on equilibrium
in games, especially Nash equilibrium and its refinements. The traditional
explanation for when and why equilibrium arises is that it results from analysis and
introspection by the players in a situation where the rules of the game, the
rationality of the players, and the players' payoff functions are all common
knowledge. Both conceptually and empirically, this theory has many
problems.

In The Theory of Learning in Games
Drew Fudenberg and David Levine develop an alternative explanation that equilibrium
arises as the long-run outcome of a process in which less than fully rational
players grope for optimality over time. The models they explore provide a foundation
for equilibrium theory and suggest useful ways for economists to evaluate and modify
traditional equilibrium concepts.